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FILED
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles

JUL 18 2016

Sherri B. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk

By Mulaul Huvera. Deputy

Michael Bivera

# SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

ALEXANDER SHLEMENKO,

Case No. BS 157778

California.

Petitioner,

VS

CALIFORNIA STATE ATHLETIC

COMMISSION,

Respondent.

Petitioner (Alexander Shlemenko) is a professional mixed-martial arts fighter. On February 13, 2015, Petitioner obtained a license to work as a professional fighter in

**RULING RE: PETITION FOR MANDATE** 

The Petition seeks a writ of mandate directing Respondent the California State

Athletic Commission ("Respondent" or the "Commission") to set aside its decision to
suspend his license for a period of three years and impose a \$10,000 fine. The

Commission initiated disciplinary proceedings against Petitioner after a urine sample he
gave shortly before a professional mixed-martial arts fight tested positive for steroids.

Petitioner contends that the Commission failed to properly administer the urine test by not
taking a "B" sample in a separate cup that would be opened and tested in his presence, that
the discipline imposed exceeded that stated in the charging letters, and that the

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Commission imposed a fine that exceeded its authority. Petitioner also argues that he was denied a fair hearing because the Commission improperly conducted its own research and exhibited bias against Petitioner and his counsel. The Petition states a cause of action for a writ of mandamus.

The Court reviews the Commission's decision under the substantial evidence test. Bus. & Prof. Code § 18841.

Petitioner has cited the hyperlink to several websites in his opening and reply briefs. This constitutes extra-record evidence that can only be considered under the narrow exception provided for in CCP § 1094.5(e). Helene Curtis Inc. v. Los Angeles County Assessment App. Bd. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 29, 37. Petitioner has not demonstrated any of the grounds for an exception under CCP § 1094.5(e), and the Court therefore declines to admit this extra-record evidence.

Following a hearing at which Dr. Anthony Butch and Petitioner's expert gave testimony, the Commission voted 7-0 to suspend Petitioner's license for three years and upheld fines of \$10,000. This appeal followed.

## "B" Sample Test

Petitioner argues that the Commission's decision should be overturned because it denied his right to have a second "B" sample of his urine taken, to be opened and tested in his presence if the "A" sample tested positive for a banned substance. Essentially, Petitioner's position is that the urine test results were unreliable in the absence of a "B" sample, and that the Commission's decision is therefore not supported by the evidence. The Court disagrees.

Petitioner argues that he was entitled to have a "B" sample taken and tested based on the Commission's contract with the UCLA Lab and the World Anti-Doping Agency ("WADA") International Standards for Laboratories. Neither is binding on the Commission.

The Commission is bound to follow its own regulations and other laws, not the Commission's agreement with its testing lab. The applicable regulations specify that the

single positive test result is sufficient to show a violation of the anti-drug rules and does not mention taking a "B" sample. 4 CCR § 303(c). Any contract between the Commission and the UCLA Lab was intended to benefit the parties to that agreement and there is no indication that the Commission intended—or had the authority—to create an additional procedural protection for the fighters under its jurisdiction. See also *Hess v. Ford Motor Co.* (2002) 27 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 516, 524 (only a party or third-party beneficiary has standing to enforce a contract).

Petitioner also contends that a "B" sample was required by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Service Administration Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drugs Testing Programs ("SAMHSA"). These guidelines are also incorporated into the agreement between the Commission and the UCLA Lab. (AR 487). These are federal regulations that do not apply to the Commission. And while SAMHSA testing procedures are mentioned in the UCLA Lab contract, Petitioner cannot demand compliance with that provision for the reasons just stated.

Finally, Petitioner appears to argue that the urine test was made unreliable by the failure to take a "B" sample. This notion is dispelled by the testimony of Dr. Butch, an undisputed expert, who testified to the UCLA Lab's testing procedures and stated that he had "never" seen an "A" sample test positive without the "B" sample also testing positive. (AR 96). Based on this evidence and the test results, the Commission could easily conclude that the urine test was reliable.

The question here is whether the Commission was required to take a "B" sample test to obtain a valid test result. It does not.

### **Due Process**

In their initial letters imposing discipline, the Commission stated that Petitioner's license was suspended for the remainder of its term, or until February 28, 2016 (*i.e.*, just under one year), and imposed fines totaling \$10,000. (AR 9-10; 40-42). The Commission, after a hearing, eventually imposed a three-year suspension in addition to the fines.

Petitioner argues that this violated "fundamental administrative principles" because the Commission *increased* the punishment following his appeal. The Commission counters that the imposition letters did not create a penalty "ceiling"; rather, the Commission was free to increase or decrease the penalty at will. The Court agrees with Petitioner's contentions.

Petitioner has not identified any authority requiring the precise *penalty* to be disclosed. However, at least one appellate decision has held that a court can vacate administrative penalties where there has not been fair and adequate notice. See *Tafti v. County of Tulare* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 891, 901. The Court agrees that under the circumstances of this case, it violated Petitioner's due process rights to increase the proposed penalty by three years. Petitioner could not have known that by appealing the suspension of his license he was reopening the issue of the length of the suspension. The Commission does not cite any authority or precedent that would allow them to increase the penalty from the original term of approximately one year. Indeed, a three-year penalty was not even discussed until the closing briefs on the penalty issue, and by that time Petitioner was unable to respond. Accordingly, the Commission violated Petitioner's due process rights by imposing a suspension that was longer than originally noticed.

## 4 CCR § 210--\$5,000 Fine

Petitioner contends that the Commission violated his due process rights by imposing two \$2,500 fines for violations of 4 CCR § 210(b). That section provides for a fine of \$2,500 for any false statement made in an application for a license. 4 CCR § 210(b). The Commission imposed two fines on Petitioner for false statements in his pre-bout questionnaire and lab intake form relating to his non-use of drugs. Since these statements were not made in connection with an application for a license, Petitioner argues that he could not be fined for making those false statements. The Court agrees.

Petitioner points out, the questionnaire and lab form were not part of any application for a license. Thus, the Commission erred when it fined Petitioner for two violations of

4 CCR § 210, which imposes fines for false statements *only* when made in connection with a license application. 4 CCR § 210.

Respondent argues that any error in the charging letters was remedied because Petitioner was informed of the substance of the charges—i.e., that he was being fined for falsifying information on the questionnaire and lab form. Not so. Business and Professions Code section 18843(a), which gives the Commission authority to impose fines, only authorizes a fine when the licensee violates any provision of this chapter or the "rules and regulations" of the Commission. While lying on a form submitted to the Commission is most likely prohibited by some rule or regulation, the Commission needed to specify which rule formed the basis for discipline to satisfy due process. See Wheeler v. State Bd. of Forestry (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 522, 527 ("Disciplinary action cannot be founded upon a charge not made."). Indeed, the rules governing the Commission's administrative hearing expressly require the accusation to "specify the statutes and rules which the respondent is alleged to have violated...." Gov. Code § 11503(a). The only violation cited in the charging letters was 4 CCR § 210, which Petitioner did not violate. Accordingly, the fines based on the two purposed violations of 4 CCR § 210 cannot stand.

Any error caused by the Commissioner's statements concerning the penalties imposed by other jurisdiction is moot.

#### Bias

Bias and prejudice are never implied; the party seeking to show bias must support its claim with "concrete facts." *Nasha L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles* (2004) 125 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 470, 483.

Here, Petitioner claims decision maker bias based on a few offhand statements by one of the Commissioners and his impression that they did not provide his counsel with as much time as he asked for to present his case. This conduct falls far short of the "concrete facts" showing bias that would be necessary to overturn the Commission's decision on that basis.

The Petition is granted in part. A writ shall issue directing the Commission to reduce Petitioner's suspension to a period ending on February 28, 2016. The penalties imposed shall be reduced by \$5,000. Otherwise, the Petition is denied.

Dated: 7-18-16

ROBERT H. O'BRIEN
Judge of the Superior Court

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